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Abstract
Background: Studies of recent hospital outbreaks caused by multiresistant P.aeruginosa (MRPA) have often failed
to identify a specific environmental reservoir. We describe an outbreak due to a single clone of multiresistant (MR)
Pseudomonas aeruginosa (PA) and evaluate the effectiveness of the surveillance procedures and control measures
applied.
Methods: Patients with MRPA isolates were prospectively identified (January 2006-May 2008). A combined
surveillance procedure (environmental survey, and active surveillance program in intensive care units [ICUs]) and an
infection control strategy (closure of ICU and urology wards for decontamination, strict compliance with cross-
transmission prevention protocols, and a program restricting the use of carbapenems in the ICUs) was designed
and implemented.
Results: Three hundred and ninety patients were identified. ICU patients were the most numerous group (22%)
followed by urology patients (18%). Environmental surveillance found that 3/19 (16%) non-ICU environmental
samples and 4/63 (6%) ICU samples were positive for the MRPA clonal strain. In addition, active surveillance found
that 19% of patients were fecal carriers of MRPA. Significant changes in the trends of incidence rates were noted
after intervention 1 (reinforcement of cleaning procedures): -1.16 cases/1,000 patient-days (95%CI -1.86 to -0.46; p =
0.003) and intervention 2 (extensive decontamination): -1.36 cases/1,000 patient-days (95%CI -1.88 to -0.84; p <
0.001) in urology wards. In addition, restricted use of carbapenems was initiated in ICUs (January 2007), and their
administration decreased from 190-170 DDD/1,000 patient-days (October-December 2006) to 40-60 DDD/1,000
patient-days (January-April 2007), with a reduction from 3.1 cases/1,000 patient-days in December 2006 to 2.0
cases/1,000 patient-days in May 2007. The level of initial carbapenem use rose again during 2008, and the
incidence of MRPA increased progressively once more.
Conclusions: In the setting of sustained MRPA outbreaks, epidemiological findings suggest that patients may be a
reservoir for further environmental contamination and cross-transmission. Although our control program was not
successful in ending the outbreak, we think that our experience provides useful guidance for future approaches to
this problem.
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Background
Classically, P.aeruginosa nosocomial infections have
been considered to be polyclonal endemic infections
that follow secondary endogenous intestinal and primary
respiratory tract colonization in patients admitted to
ICUs or other hospital wards who have previously
received antibiotic therapy [1-3]. However, in this set-
ting, outbreaks caused by some particularly transmissible
strains which often show multiresistance to antibiotics
have also been reported. The capacity to control these
outbreaks varies greatly and dependes on the reservoir.
Outbreaks are usually circumscribed in time and attri-
butable to a point source of infection which can be
identified in the environment [4-8].
Over the past decade, an increase in hospital out-
breaks caused by multiresistant P.aeruginosa (MRPA)
has been reported in a new epidemiological setting. Stu-
dies have often failed to identify a specific environmen-
tal reservoir [9-15], and point toward patients as an
additional potential reservoir, as in the case of a large
sustained epidemic/endemic caused by multiresistant
Acinetobacter baumannii [16]. While several studies of
the risk factors and clinical features of patients colo-
nized or infected with multiresistant P.aeruginosa have
been conducted [17,18], the management strategies for
these prolonged MRPA outbreaks and the contribution
of antibiotic restriction [9] to their control have not
been analyzed in depth.
Since 2003 there has been an increase in the number
of carbapenem-resistant P.aeruginosa isolates in our
hospital. A retrospective microbiological revision in
2005 showed a progressive increase in P.aeruginosa
strains exhibiting the same multiresistant antibiotype,
and molecular typing of selected strains demonstrated
the presence of an outbreak in several hospital wards.
Despite strict barrier precautions for controlling infec-
tion, the incidence of MRPA continued to rise through-
out the hospital.
Here, we describe a large-scale sustained outbreak of a
multiresistant strain of P.aeruginosa in our hospital and
evaluate the effectiveness of the control measures
applied.
Methods
Setting and Definitions
The study was performed at the Hospital Universitari de
Bellvitge, a 900-bed public tertiary-care institution for
adult patients. The MRPA surveillance programme was
initiated in January 2006 and all patients colonized or
infected with MRPA were prospectively identified.
MRPA was defined as strains resistant to ≥ 3 of the
following classes of antibiotics: antipseudomonal penicil-
lins, antipseudomonal oxyimino-b-lactams, fluoroquino-
lones, aminoglycosides, and carbapenems [19]. A clinical
sample positive for MRPA was considered to have been
acquired in a specific ward if it appeared either during a
stay in this ward or within a week of discharge from it.
The remaining patients with clinical samples positive for
P.aeruginosa and without the MRPA phenotype isolate
from the time of admission to the time of discharge
from hospital were considered non-MRPA.
Clinical assessment was determined in accordance
with the definitions of the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention for nosocomial infections [20]. Patients
with positive clinical samples for MRPA but without
related signs or symptoms of infection were considered
to be colonized.
Microbiological studies
P. aeruginosa strains were identified and tested for anti-
microbial susceptibility by a MicroScan automated
microdilution system using CN1S and CO1S panels
(Dade International, West Sacramento, CA, USA). CLSI
(Clinical and Laboratory Standards Institute) criteria
[21] were used to define susceptibility or resistance to
these antimicrobial agents.
We selected 284 MRPA phenotype strains isolated
throughout the whole period (2006 [132], 2007 [101],
2008 [51]) for pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE)
analysis using a method described previously [13]. DNA
was digested with SpeI and DNA fragments were sepa-
rated with a CHEF DR III apparatus (Bio-Rad Labora-
tories, Hercules, CA, USA). Electrophoresis was run at 6
v/cm, 14°C for 20 hours with pulses ranging from 0,5 to
25 seconds. DNA restriction patterns generated by
PFGE were interpreted according to the guidelines [22].
Isolates with PFGE patterns differing in more than four
fragments were ascribed to distinct genotypes; differ-
ences in four restriction fragments or fewer were con-
sidered to be subtypes of a single genotype [23].
The mechanisms responsible for the multidrug-resis-
tant phenotype detected were studied in three represen-
tative isolates from the epidemic clone. The potential
presence of horizontally acquired b-lactamases was
explored by phenotypic tests, which included Etest MBL
strips (AB Biodisk, Solna, Sweden) for the detection of
class B carbapenemases and double disk synergy tests
(DDST) for the detection of ESBLs, using amoxicillin-
clavulanate and ceftazidime, cefepime, aztreonam, imi-
penem, or meropenem disks (distance from 5 to 30
mm). To examine the involvement of mutation-driven
resistance mechanisms in the multidrug-resistant pheno-
type, the relative mRNA expression of the genes encod-
ing the major P. aeruginosa efflux pumps (mexB, mexD,
mexF and mexY) and the chromosomal cephalospori-
nase (ampC) was determined by real-time PCR as
described elsewhere [24,25]. Isolates were considered to
be hyperproducers if the relative expression of the
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corresponding gene was at least three times (mexB) or
ten times (mexD, mexF mexY, and ampC) greater than
the figure documented for the reference PAO1 strain. In
addition, in order to detect inactivating mutations caus-
ing carbapenem resistance, oprD genes from these iso-
lates were amplified by PCR and fully sequenced, using
previously described primers and conditions [26]. The
sequences obtained were compared with those available
in the GenBank.
Environmental survey
To determine the possible route of transmission or
reservoir in the hospital’s physical environment, a total
of 78 samples, 30 from room equipment (bedside tables,
bed rails, phones, plug holes, tap handles, door handles,
call buttons), 36 from sink surfaces, and 12 from water
samples were taken from the urology and ICU wards,
the wards which initially had the highest incidence.
Twenty samples, (13 from urology wards and seven
from the ICU), were obtained in February 2006 using
moistened swabs, another 16 samples were obtained in
September 2006 from the urology wards, and the
remaining 42 samples were collected from the ICU dur-
ing 2007. In addition, to improve our capacity to detect
contamination, in 2008 we modified the swab technique
by introducing the use of moistened sterile gauze pads
[27]. Another 82 samples were collected (63 from ten
ICU rooms and 19 from four non-ICU rooms). All these
samples were taken from room equipment. During the
surveillance procedure, all the non-ICU rooms had
admitted patients with known MRPA colonization, com-
pared with only three ICU rooms. The genetic similarity
of MRPA strains isolated in the environmental survey
was investigated by PFGE.
Active surveillance program
To determine the strength of the human reservoir, we
carried out longitudinal active surveillance of rectal
swabs in an ICU unit over a one-month period (March
2006). Weekly rectal swab samples were obtained on
admission in order to identify digestive tract carriage of
MRPA between ICU admission and discharge or the
time to MRPA clinical sample detection. Patients
admitted to the unit for less than 48 hours and those
with MRPA digestive tract colonization at ICU admis-
sion were excluded.
Infection control interventions
Infection control measures: Intervention 1: Disposable
aprons and gloves were used while caring for MRPA
colonized/infected patients, and cleaning procedures
were strictly supervised by infection control nurses
(rooms were routinely cleaned once a day using water
and liquid soap with 500 parts per million [ppm]
hypochlorite, and rooms with colonized patients were
cleaned twice a day in the same way but with a hypo-
chlorite concentration of 1,000 ppm, and using a specific
checklist for high-touch surfaces). ICU patients were in
single rooms and patients in non-ICU wards were spa-
tially segregated inside a single room. These infection
control measures were introduced in February 2006.
Intervention 2: Environmental cleanliness was rein-
forced, particularly in the ICU (which was closed for
extensive decontamination, consisting in rigorous clean-
ing of the medical equipment and painting of the wards,
in July-August 2006 and July-August 2007) and the
urology ward (which was decontaminated in August
2007).
Restriction of carbapenem use in ICUs: In January
2007 the use of carbapenem for ICU patients was
restricted. Compliance with this policy was monitored.
Consumption was expressed as defined daily doses
(DDD) [28].
Statistical analysis
An interrupted time series analysis was performed
using the segmented linear regression procedure [29],
evaluating the impact of the intervention on the level
(abrupt change immediately following the interven-
tion) and the secular trend of the series (change in
the slope of the incidence rate following the interven-
tion). The level and trend of the pre-intervention seg-
ments served as the control for the post-intervention
segment.
MRPA patients included those who presented at least
one MRPA specimen obtained during admission; pre-
viously known cases who tested positive on readmission
were excluded, and newly identified cases attending the
outpatient clinic were included from the date of prior
admission. Colonization pressure was calculated
monthly in the ICUs and the urology ward as follows:
number of MRPA patient-days × 100/total number of
patient-days [30].
To evaluate the effect of the interventions performed
in the urology ward, four time segments were defined
(Figure 1). Segments 1 and 3 served as the pre-interven-
tion (baseline) periods. Time points before May 2006
were excluded from the analysis, since there were fewer
than three observations before and after an intervention
performed in February 2006 [31]. The interventions stu-
died were: Intervention 1 “reinforcement of control
measures and cleaning procedures” (October 2006) and
Intervention 2 “extensive decontamination” (August
2007). The analysis was adjusted for the colonization
pressure of the immediately preceding month and for
the level and trend of the pre-intervention periods. Sta-
tistical analysis was performed with SPSS software, ver-
sion 14.0.
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Ethical considerations
The study formed part of the medical care provided in
the setting of the surveillance and control of nosocomial
outbreaks, and the physician had good reason to believe
that participation in the research study would not
adversely affect the health of the patients. All the sam-
ples and exams performed on patients were part of stan-
dard care procedures for epidemiological control. The
study was approved by the local ethic committee of the
hospital Universitari de Bellvitge and no informed con-
sent was requested.
Results
Description of the outbreak
From January 2006 to May 2008, 390 consecutive
patients were colonized or infected by a main phenotype
of MRPA; 288 (74%) patients were males with a mean
age of 62.4 (SD ± 19.7) years; 85 (22%) were ICU
patients and 305 patients acquired the MRPA strain in a
non-ICU setting. The urology service [54 patients/305
(18%)] was the non-ICU ward with the highest rates of
MRPA acquisition; the remaining patients were recorded
in 30 other wards.
Among the 390 patients with clinical samples for
MRPA, 165 (42%) patients were infected, with urin-
ary tract infection [45 episodes (28%)] being the most
frequent MRPA infection. Forty-six episodes (28%)
were intra-abdominal infections: 36 (22%) surgical
site infections, and 10 (6%) biliary infections. All 37
(23%) episodes of lower respiratory tract infection
were observed in ICU patients. The remaining infec-
tions were: eleven (7%) primary bloodstream
infections, 12 (7%) bone and joint infections, nine
(6%) soft-tissue infections and five miscellaneous
infections. Seventy-two (44%) out of 165 infected
patients died. Of these deaths, 14 (19%) were attribu-
ted to MRPA infection.
Microbiological and genotypic analysis
The antibiotic susceptibility patterns of MRPA strains
isolated during the study period are summarized in
Table 1. Genotypic analysis showed that the selected
MRPA strains belonged to a single clone responsible for
a large sustained outbreak and no relationship was
found between this majority clone and the MRPA
strains detected in our hospital in an earlier MRPA out-
break [5].
All phenotypic tests for the detection of acquired b-
lactamases yielded negative results. In contrast, the pan-
b-lactam resistance phenotype was found to be driven
by the interplay of the hyperproduction of the chromo-
somal cephalosporinase AmpC (238 ± 34-fold increased
expression of ampC respect to wild-type reference strain
PAO1) and the inactivation of OprD porin, caused by a
C to T mutation in nucleotide 424 of oprD, which leads
to a premature stop codon at amino acid 142. Further-
more, no significant modification of the expression of
the efflux pump encoding genes mexB, mexD, mexF, or
mexY was detected.
Environmental survey results
Three of 36 (8%) initial samples were positive for clonal
MRPA strain. All three strains were isolated in wet
areas in the urology ward. None of the remaining 42
samples (moistened surfaces, room equipment and
water samples) from the ICU wards showed MRPA
growth. Thirteen samples, five of them from water,
showed growth for carbapenem-susceptible P.
aeruginosa.
In addition, with the modified gauze technique [27],
three of 19 (16%) samples from non-ICU rooms were
positive for the MRPA clonal strain, while only four of
63 (6%) ICU samples were positive.
Active surveillance program
During the study period, 42 patients were admitted to
the ICU; of these, six patients with an ICU stay of less
than 48 hours and five carriers of digestive tract MRPA
at ICU admission were excluded. Thirty-one patients
were included, and six digestive tract carriers were colo-
nized by MRPA (19%). The mean time to MRPA acqui-
sition between ICU admission and digestive tract
carriage was 22 days. The mean time between carriage
of MRPA in the digestive tract and the detection of
positive clinical samples was 11 days (range 1 to 21
days).
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Figure 1 Reduction in the rate of MRPA cases in urology ward:
Intervention 1: reinforcement cleaning procedures;
Intervention 2: extensive decontamination.
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Response to infection control intervention programs
Before the interventions, there was a significant month
to month increase in MRPA cases in the urology ward:
segment 1: increase of 0.67 cases/1,000 patient-days
(95%CI 0.21 to 1.12; p = 0.006) and segment 3: increase
of 1.53 cases/1,000 patient-days (95%CI 0.84 to 2.23; p <
0.001). However, significant changes in the trends of
incidence rates were noted after both interventions:
intervention 1: -1.16 cases/1,000 patient-days (95%CI
-1.86 to -0.46; p = 0.003) and intervention 2: -1.36
cases/1,000 patient-days (95%CI -1.88 to -0.84; p <
0.001). This represents a mean decrease of 5.4 MRPA
cases/1,000 patient-days after intervention 1, and an
even more marked reduction, 8.4 cases/1,000 patient-
days, after intervention 2. Concomitantly, after interven-
tion 2, an immediate effect was found in the first
month: -1.58 cases/1,000 patient-days (95%CI -3.50 to
0.33; p = 0.09) (Figure 1).
In addition, restricted use of carbapenems was
initiated in January 2007 (Figure 2). Carbapenem use
decreased from 190-170 DDD/1,000 patient-days in the
period immediately before the implementation of this
restriction (October-December 2006) to 40-60 DDD/
1,000 patient-days after its initiation (January-April
2007), with a reduction from 3.1 cases/1,000 patient-
days in December 2006 to 2.0 cases/1,000 patient-days
in May 2007. However, after this strong initial decrease,
we observed a moderate increase in carbapenem con-
sumption, which rose to around 100 DDD/1,000
patient-days from May to December 2007 and a pro-
gressive increase in incidence. Segmented linear regres-
sion analysis could not easily be applied in ICU
intervention (carbapenem use restriction) since no evi-
dent linear patterns were found following the
intervention.
Discussion
We provide epidemiological information on a large-scale
sustained MRPA outbreak occurring at our hospital
over a period of more than three years. An epidemic
clone prevailing in the urology and ICU wards spread
rapidly throughout many other wards despite an epide-
miological surveillance program; no specific source of
outbreak could be identified and the clone became
endemic. This is a new epidemiological scenario with
serious consequences.
Table 1 Antibiotic susceptibility of multiresistant P.aeruginosa clone strains
Range MIC50 MIC90 Breakpoint %I
a %Rb Breakpoint %Ia Rb
CLSI 2009 EUCAST2009
S R S R
PIP ≤ 16- > 64 64 > 64 ≤ 64 ≥128 - 39 ≤ 16 > 16 - 97
TIC ≤ 16- > 64 64 > 64 ≤ 64 ≥128 - 42 ≤ 16 > 16 - 98
TZP ≤ 16/4- > 64/4 64/4 > 64/4 ≤ 64/4 ≥128/4 - 35 ≤ 16/4 > 16/4 - 93
ATM 2- > 16 16 > 16 ≤ 8 ≥32 85 14 ≤ 1 > 16 85 14
CAZ 2- > 16 16 > 16 ≤ 8 ≥32 75 22 ≤ 8 > 8 - 97
FEP 2- > 16 16 > 16 ≤ 8 ≥32 82 17 ≤ 8 > 8 - 99
GEN ≤ 4- > 8 > 8 > 8 ≤ 4 ≥16 0 99 ≤ 4 > 4 - 99
TOB ≤ 4- > 8 > 8 > 8 ≤ 4 ≥16 1 95 ≤ 4 > 4 - 96
AMK ≤ 8- > 16 ≤ 8 > 16 ≤ 16 ≥64 0 21 ≤ 8 > 16 29 21
IPM 8- > 8 > 8 > 8 ≤ 4 ≥16 10 90 ≤ 4 > 8 10 90
MEM 8- > 8 > 8 > 8 ≤ 4 ≥16 33 67 ≤ 2 > 8 33 67
CIP 2- > 2 > 2 > 2 ≤ 1 ≥4 2 98 ≤ 0.5 > 1 100
Colistin ≤ 2 ≤ 2 ≤ 2 ≤ 2 ≥4 0 0 ≤ 2 > 2 0 0
a Intermediate.
b Resistant.
PIP = Piperacillin; TIC = Ticarcillin; TZP = Piperacillin-tazobactam; ATM = Aztreonam; CAZ = Ceftazidime; FEP = Cefepime; GEN = Gentamicin; TOB = Tobramycin;
AMK = Amikacin; IPM = Imipenem; MEM = Meropenem; CIP = Ciprofloxacin.
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Our observations contrast strongly with the classical
view of the epidemiology of nosocomial P.aeruginosa
infections. These nosocomial P.aeruginosa infections
were considered to be polyclonal, endemic and opportu-
nistic, affecting patients with underlying diseases under-
going multiple manipulations and receiving broad
spectrum antibiotic therapy [3].
Several hospital outbreaks caused by multiresistant P.
aeruginosa have been reported [9-15]. Although coloni-
zation by P.aeruginosa frequently precedes overt infec-
tion, the original source of the organism and the precise
mode of transmission are often unclear.
In our large clonal endemic setting, we were unable to
identify a particular reservoir responsible for the out-
break. We investigated all the wet areas that were likely
to be sources of contamination. Environmental surveil-
lance was performed in the urology and ICU wards, the
wards with the highest incidence, but in neither case did
the study provide a great deal of information. The level
of detection improved when a moistened gauze was used
(0% in ICU and 8% in non-ICU using swabs versus 6% in
ICU and 18% in non-ICU with gauze), although no paral-
lel analysis of the two techniques was performed. In addi-
tion, the sites that tested positive for the epidemic clone
were near colonized patients, and the presence of this
clone in the environment may have been a simple conse-
quence of the outbreak rather than a source for transmis-
sion of the strain [32]. Nevertheless, two specific
interventions involving the reinforcement of cleaning
procedures for extensive decontamination were applied
in the urology wards and MRPA rates decreased signifi-
cantly during the months following the interventions, a
finding that supports the transitory efficacy of these epi-
demiological control measures
The results of our active surveillance program and
environmental cultures in the ICU setting suggest that
patients may indeed be a reservoir in the maintenance
of the monoclonal MRPA outbreak. Our capacity of
detection of MRPA intestinal carriers in ICUs was lower
than the rates found in the screening programs of two
other outbreaks at our hospital [33,34]; however, in
those two settings the capacity of the outbreak to spread
was higher. These findings are borne out by the longer
period of time recorded between ICU admission and
digestive colonization: 22 days in the present study ver-
sus < 7 days in those outbreaks.
No doubt, cross-transmission plays a relevant epide-
miological role in our MRPA ICU patients [35], but as
no hand-print cultures of health care workers were per-
formed in our study, we cannot provide direct evidence
that strains were transmitted patient to patient by the
health care workers.
Moreover, our data suggest that antibiotic pressure
plays a decisive role, by altering the ecological niche in
these patients and providing a selective growth advan-
tage for MRPA organisms. Thus, given that the carbape-
nem consumption in our ICUs in 2006 was high, we
assumed that carbapenem restriction might make a sig-
nificant contribution to controlling the outbreak. The
carbapenem restriction program carried out during 2007
was initially followed by a marked reduction; however, a
moderate increase was recorded in the second semester
and the levels rose again during 2008. Concomitantly,
an increase in the level of piperacillin-tazobactam use
was observed and a new cluster, particularly in the ICU,
was found [36]; the dominant use of this antibiotic
could have favored the emergence and spread of this
different clone, and as a result, the carbapenem restric-
tion was relaxed. Carbapenem restriction did not signifi-
cantly reduce the number of MRPA cases, although this
antibiotic program may not have been sufficiently rigor-
ous or prolonged. Furthermore, we cannot rule the pos-
sibility that the use of fluoroquinolones may also have
contributed to promoting these MRPA strains [17].
Although fluoroquinolone consumption did not increase
during the period analyzed (data not shown), overall
fluoroquinolone use was considerably higher than that
of other antipseudomonal antibiotics. Thus, the limita-
tion of fluoroquinolone use should have been included
in our antibiotic restriction program.
Finally, our epidemiological control program had sev-
eral limitations. First, we did not perform decontamina-
tion in other hospital wards; second, it is possible that
the evaluation of MRPA digestive tract carriers in cer-
tain non-ICU wards would have allowed earlier spatial
segregation and would thus have prevented a substantial
number of possible cross-transmissions; and third, an
extensive antibiotic program restricted to non-ICU
wards might have contributed to lower incidence rates.
Conclusion
In conclusion, we faced a large and sustained MRPA
outbreak that became endemic in our hospital after
three years. In the absence of a recognized source of
contamination, the reasons for the wide dissemination
of the clone remain unclear. However, considering the
general epidemiology of nosocomial P.aeruginosa infec-
tions, we speculate that more efficient nosocomial
clones are more likely to acquire resistance determinants
and that antibiotic pressure in the hospital environment
favors their further spread [37]. Epidemiological findings
suggest that patients may be a reservoir for further
environmental contamination and cross-transmission.
However, although unlikely, we cannot completely rule
out the possibility of an environmental reservoir. Further
studies should try to determine the extent to which rea-
listic and prolonged restriction antibiotic programs can
contribute to fighting this epidemiological challenge.
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